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HUMILIATION AT WORK
CATHERINE L. FIsK*
Humiliation has a significant impact on the working lives of many
people. That humiliation should be the basis for making certain
employment practices or incidents actionable we often take for
granted. Yet, we lack an encompassing theory of when humiliation
is, or should be, actionable. Courts and scholars have focused on
particular forms of humiliation, notably those associated with racial
and gender harassment, invasions of privacy, and a few "nearly
bizarre" cases of wrongful termination.' However, no one has
attempted systematically to define when workplace humiliation should
be actionable.
The explicit premise of the various laws that address workplace
humiliation is that work life is full of humiliating experiences and
not all of them can or should be illegal. Therefore, no intentionally
inflicted psychological harm is actionable unless the behavior is
"outrageous" and the victim suffers distress.2 Sex-, race-, or other
status-based harassment is legal unless it is so pervasive or severe
as to render the workplace "unreasonably" hostile.' All sorts of
annoying or humiliating invasions of privacy are permissible unless
a court finds both that the employer led employees to believe they
could expect privacy and that the invasion was "highly offensive"4
or "serious."5 By condoning less than egregious forms of humiliation,
the law systematically underestimates the corrosive effect of workplace
humiliation. This largely ad hoc approach to workplace humiliation
provides little predictability.
If courts better appreciated the debilitating nature of certain
forms of humiliation, it would be more difficult to dismiss certain
conduct as insufficiently outrageous or hostile. A broader theory of
* Professor of Law & William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thanks
to Susan Bandes, Mary Becker, Elizabeth Rappaport, Carol Sanger, Cynthia Ward, and the
editors of the William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law for a very thought-provoking
symposium. Erwin Chemerinsky's careful reading of an earlier draft was enormously helpful.
I am grateful for the research assistance of Eric Compere, An Le, Corey Lee, and Max Rieger.
1. The very apt characterization of the intentional infliction of emotional distress cases
is Regina Austin's. Her work on this topic is a crucial starting point for anyone interested in
this subject. Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1988).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
3. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 18 (1993).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1965).
5. The California Constitution protects against private actors who cause "serious"
invasions of privacy. See Loder v. Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200 (Cal. 1997).
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humiliation might also relieve the current stalemate in the literature
on whether the law provides too few or too many protections for
employees who suffer humiliation at work.6 Alongside the extensively
documented analyses of endemic subordination and harassment7 and
elegantly theorized accounts of why sexual harassment is wrong,8
there are concerned, and even bitter, analyses of the significant
liability employers face and the threat to free speech posed by what
some perceive as the law's misguided efforts to stamp out any mention
of romance, sex, religion, politics, or culture at work.9 One has the
sense that the authors perceive the world so differently that they
cannot even begin to frame common issues, much less to debate them.
Even among those who believe that law should remedy humiliation
and abuse at work, there is disagreement about whether existing laws
and proposed reforms focus too much or too little on status-based
harassment as opposed to other forms of, and motivations for,
humiliation."°
6. Compare, e.g., Austin, supra note 1 (too few), with Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The Case Against "Tortification" of
Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1994) (too many).
7. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
8. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 1169 (1998) (discussing the literature); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment
with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445 (1997); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual
Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997).
9. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religious Speech in the Workplace: Harassment or Protected
Speech?, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLy 959 (1999); Kingsley R. Browne, Title VIIas Censorship:
Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991);
Duffy, supra note 6; Mark P. Gergen, A Grudging Defense of the Role of Collateral Torts in
Wrongful Termination Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1693 (1996); Eugene Volokh, What Speech
Does 'Hostile Work Environment" Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997).
There have been many critiques of the scholarship that argues for First Amendment
protection for sexually or racially harassing workplace speech so many, indeed, that citing
even a sample makes for a very long footnote. See, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS
(1993); Frederick Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW (Catharine MacKinnon & Reva Siegel eds., 2001); J.M. Balkin,
Essay, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295 (1999); Deborah
Epstein, Can a "Dumb-Ass Woman"Achieve Equality in the Workplace? Running the Gauntlet
of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399 (1996); Charles R. Lawrence III,
If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (1990);
Judith Resnik, Changing the Topic, 8 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 339 (1996); Nadine Strossen,
Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment and Upholding the First Amendment-Avoiding a
Collision, 37 VILL. L. REV. 757 (1992).
10. Compare, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic
Understanding of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1 (1999) (too much), and David C.
Yamada, The Phenomenon of 'Workplace Bullying" and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile
Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475 (2000) (same), with Austin, supra note 1 (too
little arguing that white women and people of color suffer significantly greater harassment
at work, and too little protection from it).
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Among practicing attorneys the sense of radically different
realities is even greater. Lawyers representing defendant employers
are convinced that "slacking" employees can, and frequently do, file
suit and "extort" significant settlements over trivial incidents.
Plaintiffs lawyers, alternatively, worry whether law has the ability
to stop or remedy endemic humiliation and abuse in the workplace. "
Without a legal theory built around workplace humiliation, it is
difficult to respond to charges that only women and people of color
can sue if they are humiliated at work. Without an accepted theory,
the "equal opportunity harasser" - the supervisor who is abusive
to employees irrespective of race, sex, or gender - is, at best, a
problem for equal rights theorists and, at worst, a poster child for the
excesses of antidiscrimination law.
For all these reasons, we need a systematic understanding of the
nature and causes of workplace humiliation, the various harms it
causes, and the available legal remedies. Acknowledging the causes
and consequences of humiliation might give us a better understanding
of the task ahead: developing an employment law and theory that
allows dignity for all while meeting the concerns of those who believe
that vague legal standards generate legal expenses without meaning-
ful changes in workplace culture. The book that prompted this
symposium and the symposium itself may contribute to that under-
standing.' Close attention to the intersection ofgenderjurisprudence
and emotions jurisprudence is likely to be uniquely helpful in
assessing the phenomenon of humiliation at work.
This article is only a preliminary look at the larger project I
describe. In Part I, I briefly introduce some of the growing body of
psychological literature on humiliation, showing how humiliation -
particularly at work - is far more harmful than the law typically
recognizes. Part II surveys the law's treatment of workplace
humiliation, cataloging the arbitrariness and bias in existing doctrines
and remedies. Finally, Part III suggests directions for future work.
11. The employer's perception that there has been an avalanche of meritless harassment
and wrongful termination litigation may be in part a product of HR professionals and law
firms selling the need for their services rather than a systematic analysis of verdicts. See
generally Lauren B. Edelman, Steven E. Abraham & Howard S. Erlanger, Professional
Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SoCy REV. 47
(1992).
12. THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
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I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMILIATION AT WORK
Humiliation is one of a number of emotions that have recently
garnered significant attention in psychological literature. 3 The
literature reveals the tremendous importance of emotions like
humiliation and shame in the human psyche and the devastating
consequences of systematic humiliation. A thorough review of the
literature and its implications for employment law is beyond the scope
of this article. This article will simply highlight some of the more
significant findings, emphasizing the enormous impact humiliation
has in the workplace.
The discussion that follows provides empirical support from the
psychological literature for the proposition that workplace humiliation
should be a legally cognizable harm. The research described in this
section establishes three reasons for legal intervention. First, the
psychological harm of workplace humiliation can itself be as
devastating as the physical or economic harms that are legally
actionable in employment and other settings. Second, humiliation
can seriously affect the job performance of the victim, leading to
routinely compensable economic harms, such as underemployment
or unemployment. Finally, certain data suggest that employees do
not suffer humiliation and its attendant injuries equally. Women,
minorities, and some "outsider" groups may suffer disproportionately.
Thus, basic principles of fairness suggest the need to level the playing
field.
13. See, e.g., FRANCIS J. BROUCEK, SHAME AND THE SELF (1991); JOSEPH M. JONES,
AFFECTS AS PROCESS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CENTRALITY OF AFFECT IN PSYCHOLOGICAL LIFE
(1995); GERSHEN KAUFMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SHAME: THEORYAND TREATMENT OF SHAME-
BASED SYNDROMES (2d ed. 1996); HELEN MERRELL LYND, ON SHAME AND THE SEARCH FOR
IDENTITY (1958); RESEARCH AGENDAS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTIONS (Theodore D. Kemper
ed., 1990); SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THE PSYCHOLOGYOFSHAME, GUILT, EMBARRASSMENT,
AND PRIDE (June Price Tangney & Kurt W. Fischer eds., 1995); SHAME: INTERPERSONAL
BEHAVIOR, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE (Paul Gilbert & Bernice Andrews eds., 1998);
THE WIDENING SCOPE OF SHAME (Melvin R. Lansky & Andrew P. Morrison eds., 1997); Linda
M. Hartling & Tracy Luchetta, Humiliation: Assessing the Impact of Derision, Degradation,
and Debasement, 19 J. PRIMARY PREVENTION 259 (1999); Loraleigh Keashly, Interpersonal and
Systemic Aspects of Emotional Abuse at Work: The Target's Perspective, at http://www.
worktrauma.orgtfoundation/research/Loraleigh.htm; Donald C. Klein, The Humiliation
Dynamic: An Overview, 12 J. PRIMARY PREVENTION 93 (1991); Herman Sarphatie, On Shame
and Humiliation: Some Notes on Early Development and Pathology, in THE DUTCH ANNUAL
OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (Hans Groen-Prakken & Antonie Ladad eds., 1993); Special Issue - The
Humiliation Dynamic: Viewing the Task of Prevention from a New Perspective, Part 1, 12 J.
PRIMARY PREVENTION 87 (1991); Julian L. Staumm, The Meaning of Humiliation and Its
Relationship to Fluctuations in Self-Esteem, 5 INTL REV. PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 425 (1978).
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"To be humiliated is to be put down.""' To be humiliated is,
figuratively, to have one's face forced into the ground and be made
to eat dirt. To be humiliated is to have one's "significance," that is,
"one's sense of having value in the eyes of others," undermined. 15 As
used in the psychological literature, "significance" is an enormously
powerful and socially important construct: it is vital to the emotional
well-being of every person and can be fostered "by exposing people
to environments in which they can realize their potentials because
they know they're needed, wanted, and valued by others who are
important to them."16
Humiliation is an emotion that is usually interpersonal rather
than wholly internal to the person. "Humiliation tends to be a triadic
affair, requiring one who humiliates, one who is humiliated, and one
witness (or more) whose good opinion is important to the one
humiliated." 7 As personality theorist Karen Homey argues, "[wie
will feel ashamed if we do, think, or feel something that violates our
pride. And we will feel humiliated if others do something that hurts
our pride, or fail to do what our pride requires of them."' s Humiliation
typically occurs in relationships of unequal power where the
humiliator has power over the victim, 9 although it can happen -
and humiliation can be most intense -when a person of lower status
criticizes and thus humiliates one of higher status.2 °
In general, psychological research reveals that people experience
humiliation when others treat them as objects or as having worth
not equal to that of the humiliator or witnesses. Humiliation and
shame occur, concluded one study, "when one is trying to relate'to
the other as a subject but feels objectified."2 Being ignored by others
is an example of such objectification. "[R]eceiving no response from
the other whom one is addressing is a form of rejection; it is
characteristic of an object that it can be ignored, and shame, as we
have emphasized, is intimately connected with the sense of being
objectified or dehumanized."' The pain felt by the objectified
14. Klein, supra note 13, at 97.
15. Id. at 100.
16. Id. at 101.
17. BROUCEK, supra note 13, at 75. See also Klein, supra note 13, at 101.
18. KAREN HORNEY, NEUROSIS AND HUMAN GROWTH: THE STRUGGLE TOWARD SELF-
REALIZATION 95 (1950).
19. Hartling & Luchetta, supra note 13, at 261.
20. Klein, supra note 13, at 104 (quoting Karen Homey as saying: "Criticism from people
of lower status is the ultimate humiliation').
21. HORNEY, supra note 18, at 47.
22. BROUCEK, supra note 13, at 90.
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individual precisely justifies prohibiting status-based harassment
and discrimination.
The recurring infliction of humiliation and shame can be
extremely corrosive for the psyche of the victim. Even if the individual
incidents are minor, repetition magnifies the effect.' When humilia-
tion occurs in an institutional setting like the workplace, it can be
destructive for the organization as a whole.2 ' Victims tend to feel
"degraded, confused, powerless, paralyzed, ostracized, violated, or
assaulted."' Humiliation becomes a barrier to the full realization
of the self and to the ability of people within the organization to work
with each other.2" Victims sometimes adopt the strategy of acting
the part that the humiliator forces the victim to play as if playing were
their choice. In fact, devoting oneself to the role of "object",may be
a paradoxical attempt to eliminate the shame ofobjectification. 7 Such
a strategy can be inimical to gaining respect and competence in a work
setting.2 8
Scholars and practitioners have linked a number of psychopatho-
logies, some quite severe, to humiliation. Humiliation has been
"implicated - directly or indirectly - in many, if not most, clinically
recognized emotional and social disorders."' Humiliation can cause
depression, paranoia, violence, generalized and social anxiety, and
suicide.3'
Humiliation at work can also cause less severe effects. Psycho-
logical literature notes that destructive criticism can prevent the
recipient of the criticism from working effectively and can lower self-
esteem.31 Workplace stress associated with humiliation can interfere
23. See, e.g., Hartling & Luchetta, supra note 13, at 261 (noting the profound psychological
disorders resulting from minor humiliation).
24. See, e.g., Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1145 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding
it "difficult to conceive a workplace scenario more painful and embarrassing than an
executive, indeed a vice-president and the assistant to the president, being subjected before
his fellow employees to the most menial janitorial services and duties of cleaning up after
entry level employees."); see also Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989); Robert A. Baron,Negative
Effects of Destructive Criticism: Impact on Conflict, Self-Efficacy, and Task Performance, 73
J. APPLJED PSYCHOL. 199 (1988).
25. Hartling & Luchetta, supra note 13, at 261. See generally Klein, supra note 13
(describing the basis for Hartling and Luchetta's theory).
26. Keashly, supra note 13.
27. Id.
28. See Toni M. Massaro, Show (Some) Emotions, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 80 (Susan A.
Bandes ed., 1999).
29. Klein, supra note 13, at 106.
30. Id. at 107-12; see also Digby Tantam, The Emotional Disorders of Shame, in SHAM,
supra note 13, at 161-75 (discussing the many disorders associated with shame).
31. Baron, supra note 24.
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with job performance, which of course has long-term economic and
psychological consequences.12 The anger, lowered self-esteem, and
reduced ability to perform tasks may cause the victim's employment
evaluations to deteriorate. If law were to force full compensation for
the harm, defendants would be required to compensate for the psycho-
logical distress as well as the diminished employment opportunities.
Anecdotal evidence from cases illustrates the many and varied
psychological injuries that workplace humiliation can cause. In one
well-known case, the employee suffered such severe psychological
injuries that doctors hospitalized and treated him with electro-shock
therapy.33 The reported cases routinely note that plaintiffs testified
to suffering anxiety, depression, weight-loss, insomnia, and the like.
In one case I was involved with as a lawyer, a previously healthy
plaintiff in a hard-fought employment discrimination suit suffered
such severe anxiety that she was unable to leave her house for weeks
at a time, a debilitating condition that persisted for years.
Psychological literature further suggests that the victim is not
the only one to feel the harm of humiliation; humiliation may harm
co-workers as well.' Witnesses to humiliation "may develop a fear
of humiliation that influences their behavior to an equal or greater
degree as those who have been victims of humiliation.", Victims of
humiliation frequently respond with rage. The victim sometimes turns
the rage inward in the form of depression and despair, or outward
in efforts-to exact revenge.' For the most part, the collateral harms
suffered by co-workers go unrecognized by current law.37
Psychological literature notes the particular vulnerability: of
women, minorities, and any outsider group to humiliation.' Dominant
groups in society define the standards of normality by which they
measure subordinated groups inferior, and it is in the interest of the
dominant group to maintain its social control through humiliation.39
The outsider's status, or awareness of differentness, is an integral
part of humiliation: "Minorities are made poignantly aware of being
32. Stephan J. Motowidlo, John S. Packard & Michael R. Manning Occupational Stress:
Its Causes and Consequences for Job Performance, 71 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 618 (1986).
33. Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1145 (5th Cir. 1991).
34. Hartling & Luchetta, supra note 13, at 262.
35. Id.
36. Klein, supra note 13, at 119.
37. A few cases have allowed suits by employees who were not victims of harassment but
who suffered retaliation for opposing harassment, or who had diminished job prospects
because the victim of harassment obtained more favorable job treatment as part of a quid pro
quo.
38. KAUFMAN, supra note 13, at 272; see also infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
See generally Austin, supra note 1.
39. Hartling & Luchetta, supra note 13, at 272.
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different from others in various critical scenes around which shame
accrues. In every instance there is a lasting impression of one's
essential differentness from others, a difference that translates
immediately into deficiency, into shame."' As this scholar explained:
The development of any group-based identity is rooted in both
positive and negative identifications with one's group. Shame is
a principal source of identity for minorities because shame lies
at the root of all negative self-images. These internalized negative
cultural images have to be consciously confronted and assimilated
in a search for a coherent, positive identity. The striving for
identification is a need to feel a sense of pride in oneself precisely
because of belonging to one's group.41
To the extent that law has focused more systematically on the
humiliation of women and people of color at work, the focus is
justifiable because of the extraordinary destructiveness of being
shamed for one's very identity and because of the pervasiveness of
such humiliation that members of the dominant group never need
confront.
Psychological research also confirms what feminist scholars have
long maintained: humiliation is frequently visited upon people who
depart from traditional gender roles.42 Women and men who act in
ways considered appropriate only for members of the opposite sex
frequently experience humiliation.' To succeed in the workplace,
women may need to depart from their assigned gender roles more
often and more sharply than men. Thus, women may be particularly
at risk.
The discussion thus far has examined the nature and conse-
quences of humiliation. Here I explore the unique harms caused by
humiliation in the workplace as compared to humiliation in other
areas of life, such as school, social relations, or families. It is
important to recognize that whatever the desirability of making
humiliation in social or school settings actionable, workplace
humiliation is uniquely harmful and should also be actionable.
Humiliation at work can be an especially toxic phenomenon
because work is a place where so much of one's "significance" is
fostered. Many people find identity, community, and self-respect at
40. KAUFMAN, supra note 13, at 274.
41. Id. at 272.
42. See, e.g., Carolyn F. Swift, Some Issues in Inter-Gender Humiliation, 12 J. PRIMARY
PREVENTION 123 (1991).
43. Id.
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work." A wave of recent scholarship on the importance of community
and dignity at work canvasses the array of legal and other scholarship
documenting the social and psychological importance of workplace
culture.' The infliction of shame or humiliation is a particularly
significant issue in a setting where status is crucial.' Most work-
places have explicit or implicit economic and social hierarchies and
one's status within the hierarchy is of considerable concern to all
involved.47 Inasmuch as humiliation is an effort to lower another's
status within the hierarchy, one would expect such acts to be
particularly threatening in an organization where hierarchical status
is critical.
Contempt, by its very nature, "is an affect that partitions any
social group into two distinct classes: the superior and the inferior.
Whoever becomes the target of contempt is thereby rendered lesser,
and the minority group employing contempt as a strategy feels
superior.' Those who use contempt to enhance their own status must
find, of course, a particular group to continually render inferior. 9
The danger is of a constant cycle. "Contempt for others will usually
go hand in hand with the desire or willingness to humiliate them."50
The insights of sexual harassment theorists - that people sexually
harass those whom they feel are weak, sexually inexperienced, too
masculine, or not masculine enough in order to preserve male power
in the workplace from the perceived threat of integration by women
and "outsider" men - suggest that a cycle of anxiety and fear of
humiliation associated with loss of status prompts men to hold women
in contempt as targets of humiliation.51
Legal scholars have also recognized the above psychological
phenomena. Kathryn Abrams' work, for example, shows that the
workplace is an especially likely site for humiliation and that
systematic humiliation of some workers is uniquely destructive to
the psyche of the victims and to their prospects for full participation
at work. 2 Yet law remains skeptical about the nature and extent
of the harm caused by psychological injury even though law is not
skeptical about the nature and extent of financial injury caused by
44. Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1886 (2000).
45. See id.; Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 10 (2000).
46. Massaro, supra note 28, at 81.
47. Bandes, supra note 12, at 80; Estlund, supra note 45, at 66.
48. KAUFMAN, supra note 13, at 276.
49. Id. at 278.
50. BROUCEK, supra note 13, at 75.
51. Abrams, supra note 8, at 1192, 1219-20 (1998); Franke, supra note 8, at 725-29.
52. Abrams, supra note 24, at 1207-09.
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misrepresentation or breach of contract, or the nature or extent of
physical injury to persons or property caused by battery or trespass.
Nowhere is this truer than in the realm of employment law. Legal
scholars have remarked on the differential treatment of emotional
and physical injuries for generations, and the causes of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress tort and sexual harassment
are products of that critique. 3 The rapidly growing field of social-
psychological research on humiliation provides empirical support for
assertions that courts may have been tempted to regard as political
rather than factual.
I. THE LAW'S TREATMENT OF WORKPLACE HUMILIATION IS ARBI-
TRARY AND BIASED
The law offers a patchwork of claims for challenging humiliation
at work. The claims have different elements. Some make only
extreme humiliation actionable,54 while others recognize the wrong
in less severe humiliations.' All of them, however, share pervasive
and usually unacknowledged reliance on gendered norms of behavior,
reflecting a widespread societal aggrandizement of a masculine
agency.The law of sexual harassment has done much of the heavy lifting
in the last two decades in bringing to legal and public consciousness
the pervasiveness of humiliation at work. The scholarship on sexual
harassment has demonstrated myriad different ways that harassment
humiliates: victims are turned from competent subjects into sexual
objects; victims are denied training, tools, and the other tangible and
intangible things needed to get the job done; victims are shunned,
taunted, intimidated, assaulted, and sometimes raped.56
53. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance
and the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1067 (1936); William L. Prosser, Intentional
Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939).
54. Wimberly v. Shoney's, Inc., 39 FEP Cases 444 (Ga. 1985) (finding that some
inadvertent touching or flirtation was not enough to create a cause of action).
55. James C. Chow, Sticks, Stones, and Simple Teasing: The Jurisprudence of Non-
Cognizable Harassing Conduct in the Context of Title VI Hostile Work Environment Claims,
33 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 133 (1999).
56. Schultz, supra note 7, at 1721. See also Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women
and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases
Raising the Lack ofInterest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749,1833-38 (1990) (discussing the
treatment of women in male-dominated sex-segregated workplaces). Women are not the only
victims of these forms of harassment. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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Other legal doctrines also examine humiliation. Scholars have
long considered the autonomy-denying, objectifying humiliation of
statuS-based discrimination - whether based on race, gender, dis-
ability, or other status - a justification for prohibiting such
discrimination.57 Yet, the legal system does not protect all employees
against such humiliations; it remains legal in most states to
discriminate against or harass employees based on sexual orientation.
The humiliation of intrusive screening and invasions of privacy -
through drug-testing, personality-testing, and electronic recording
-has been the justification for developing ajurisprudence of privacy
at work." Furthermore, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress concerns suffering humiliation vis-&-vis the outrageous
behavior of another.5 9 In sum, employment law has been "tortified" °
because the legal system is receptive to arguments about the many
and varied ways in which people deliberately and destructively
humiliate others at work. Courts have now begun to see that
workplace humiliation can be uniquely destructive both economically
and psychologically.
Courts have explicitly and unapologetically refused to articulate
any standard of what humiliations are actionable as outrageous torts,
with the exception of those that strike the judge as being"outrageous"
as a matter of law.6 ' One could despair of explaining why certain
incidents of sexual harassment strike judges as outrageous 62 and
others do not.' One wonders why some interrogations strike judges
57. Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense ofthe Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1, 10 (1976) ("Racial generalizations usually inflict psychic injury whether or not they are in
fact premised on assumptions of differential moral worth." Furthermore, [the psychological
injury inflicted by generalizations based on race is compounded by the frustrating and
cumulative nature of their material injuries.").
58. The California Supreme Court, even though currently dominated by Republican
appointees, has been reasonably sensitive to the humiliation of intrusive searches of
employees. See, e.g., Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200 (Cal. 1997) (describing the
humiliation of drug-testing); Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (ruling that
employees have a "limited" expectation of privacy); see also Soroka v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.,
1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that personality testing is humiliating and
violates California constitutional right of privacy), dismissed, 862 P.2d 148 (Cal. 1993); cf
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (suggesting drug tests,
without suspicion, of some categories of current employees may be unreasonable).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
60. See supra note 6.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. c (1965).
62. Bustamento v. Tucker, 607 So. 2d 532 (La. 1992) (driving a forklift at the victim and
using the fork to pin her to the wall).
63. Gearhart v. Eye Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 814 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (telling an
employee she could get promoted only by sleeping with her boss, wearing a particular type of
pantyhose, and allowing her boss to touch her breasts and kick her in the buttocks).
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as outrageous and others do not,64 or why arbitrarily firing employees
in alphabetical order to force a suspected thief to confess is actionably
outrageous whereas just arbitrarily firing employees for no reason
is not.6
The courts' difficulty in discerning which humiliating incidents
at work should be actionable transcends the much-noted problem of
defining "hostile and pervasive" in sexual harassment law and "out-
rageous" in tort. In cases challenging discrimination in terms of
employment, courts have begun suggesting that certain incidents are
either too trivial to be actionable' or too trivial to be used as evidence
of employer bias .67 Both of these developments suggest that courts
do not appreciate why Jim Crow laws were so successful: "small"
incidents of discrimination, like segregated drinking fountains and
buses, can be as demeaning as "big" ones.
The extent to which inconsistencies in existing law are attribut-
able to insufficient appreciation of the significance of humiliation at
work is indeterminable. Even in the areas where lawyers have
attempted to educate courts about the harms of particular forms of
harassment, the law's reaction has been disappointing. Advocates
for victims of sexual harassment and discrimination have used expert
social-psychological evidence to educate judges and juries about the
harm of sexual stereotyping, sexual harassment, and sex segregation.
Scholars have described and explained the full range of harm.' This
careful and necessary illumination of the unique harms of sex-based
discrimination and harassment has perhaps had unintended
consequences, particularly in light of the lack of similar focus on the
debilitating effects of systematic humiliation on any worker.69
Scholars have suggested that women suffer uniquely and severely
from humiliation at work and have singled out a particular source
64. Compare Smithson v. Nordstrom, Inc., 664 P.2d 1119 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)
(interrogating 19-year-old employee for three hours in small windowless room is actionable),
and Gen. Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 381 A.2d 16 (Md. 1977) (finding a thirty-five minute
interrogation actionable), with Leahyv. Fed. Express Corp., 613 F. Supp. 906 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(denying the actionability of an employee's claim of being interrogated in a small room where
the security guard showed the employee that he had a gun).
65. Compare Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1976) (threatening to
fire waitresses in alphabetical order until one confessed to stealing is outrageous), with Harris
v. Ark. Book Co., 700 S.W.2d 41 (Ark. 1985) (firing an employee after forty-nine years of
service without a pension or severance pay is not outrageous).
66. See generally Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121
(1998).
67. See generally Chow, supra note 55.
68. See id. at 140-41.
69. Id. at 142-43 (noting the consequences of a failure to recognize women's differences
in workplace harassment).
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of humiliation for remedy.7" Focusing on the psyches of women may
perpetuate a protectionist assumption when courts do not consider
this kind of expert evidence about the corrosive effect of workplace
humiliation on the psyches of men.
Moreover, the courts' focus on sexual harassment as the principal
or only form of humiliation at work has allowed employers to inflict
further humiliations on employees in an effort to stop it. Law firms
now drum up business for their services by advocating that employers
prohibit dating among employees, or force dating employees to sign
so-called "consensual relationship agreements" that would be laugh-
able if they were not so demeaning.7 The absence of an encompassing
legal prohibition of workplace humiliation enables employers to
monitor and control even the minutest details of work life in the name
of reducing liability. Surely the sum total of humiliation at work is
increased rather than decreased when an employer insists that its
employees exchange the following correspondence when they
commence a dating relationship:
Dear (Name of Object of Affection):
As we discussed, I know that this may seem silly or
unnecessary to you, but I really want you to give serious
consideration to the matter as it is very important to me....
I very much value our relationship and I certainly view it
as voluntary, consensual and welcome. And I have always felt
that you feel the same. However, I know that sometimes an
individual may feel compelled to engage in or continue a
relationship against their [sic] will out of concern that it may effect
[sic] the job or working relationships.
It is very important to me that our relationship be on an equal
footing and that you be fully comfortable that our relationship
is at all times fully voluntary and welcome. I want to assure you
that under no circumstances will I allow our relationship or, should
it happen, the end of our relationship, to impact on your job or
our working relationship. Though I know you have received a copy
of(our) company's sexual harassment policy, I am enclosing a copy
... so that you can read and review it again. Once you have done
so, I would greatly appreciate your signing this letter below, if
you are in agreement with me.
(Add personal closing)
Very truly yours,
(Name)
70. Id. at 143.
71. See Tom Kuntz, Consensual Relationship Agreements for Water Cooler Paramours,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, § 4, at 7.
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I have read this letter and the accompanying sexual
harassment policy and I understand and agree with what is stated
in both this letter and the sexual harassment policy. My
relationship with (name) has been (and is) voluntary, consensual
and welcome. I also understand that I am free to end this
relationship at any time and, in doing so, it will not adversely
impact on my job.
(Signature of Object of Affection)72
Employers claim a need to protect women, and themselves, by
monitoring every single e-mail employees send to anyone and every
web site they access so as to prevent the possibility that someone
might circulate a sexistjoke on e-mail or access pornographic or erotic
web sites at work. 3 One can therefore blame the imposition of endless
scrutiny and the humiliation it causes on the presence ofhypersensi-
tive women, thus further stigmatizing and humiliating women.
That is not to suggest that women and people of color do not suffer
uniquely and encounter more humiliation at work.74 Rather, what
I suggest is that the law has attended too little to all the ways in which
people humiliate and are humiliated at work and to the question of
which humiliations should be actionable for everyone.
For all the many possible causes of action and for all the employer
alarm about the risk of liability and the huge windfall recoveries
awarded to thin-skinned, malingering, or vindictive employees, how-
ever, the remedies for workplace humiliation are severely inade-
quate.7" Most people who have disputes never assert a claim, even
against the wrongdoer. Of those who do, few hire a lawyer.76 Of those,
only a small number ever file suit." Employment law remedies are
expensive and slow in coming, to put it mildly.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Mark Isman, Computer Crimes and the Respondeat Superior Doctrine:
Employers Beware, 6 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 6 (2000); Michael H. Spencer, Defamatory E-Mail
and Employer Liability: Why Razing Zeran v. America Online is a Good Thing, 6 RICH. J.L.
& TECH. 25 (2000); Caitlin Garvey, Comment, The New Corporate Dilemma: Avoiding
Liability in the Age of Internet Technology, 25 DAYTON L. REV. 133 (1999); cf Konop v.
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (regarding an employer who violated
federal wiretap statute by accessing employee's password-protected website on which
employee criticized employer).
74. Hartling & Luchetta, supra note 13, at 271 (finding that, indeed, empirical studies
suggest that women do suffer more humiliation).
75. See generally Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L.
REV. 1093, 1099-1101, 1103 (1996) (applying general theories of harassment and discrimina-
tion to the workplace).
76. Id.
77. Id.
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Many people decline to press a claim because, as Kristin
Bumiller's work shows, it is sometimes difficult for victims even of
significant civil rights violations to cease seeing themselves as disem-
powered. 8 As critics of sexual harassment doctrine and plaintiffs'
lawyers often complain, the process of bringing a sexual harassment
suit can be extremely humiliating in itself, as the plaintiffs psycho-
logy, motives for suing, past sexual history, and work performance
routinely are subject to withering attacks in depositions and at trial.'9
The psychological literature confirms that workplace humiliation
compounds when litigation allows questioning of the motives, actions,
and integrity of the victim of harassment.' The humiliation may be
reenacted at many steps along the way, especially if the plaintiffloses
the suit. The humiliation of being told that the sexual overtures were
not unwelcome because the plaintiff acted as if she enjoyed being
sexually taunted;8' the humiliation of being told by a judge that the
plaintiff should have had a thicker skin;82 the humiliation of losing
a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress on the ground
that the conduct, while obnoxious, or boorish, or cruel, was not so far
"beyond all possible bounds of decency.., and utterly intolerable in
a civilized community."8
78. KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS
2-4 (1988) (summarizing research showing why victims of discrimination fail to challenge
wrongful actions through law).
79. See Louise Fitzgerald et al., Junk Logic: The Abuse Defense in Sexual Harassment
Litigation, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 730 (1999) (critiquing the increased use of plaintiffs
history of childhood sexual abuse as a defense to issues of unwelcomeness, reasonableness,
and damages and arguing that the studies on which the defense is based are faulty).
80. Hartling & Luchetta, supra note 13, at 272.
81. Stephens v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 220 F.3d 882, 886 (8th Cir. 2000); Kraft v. Ekco
Housewares Co., 16 F.3d 1225, 1994 WL 43806, at *3 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
840 (1994) (unpublished opinion) (affirming district court's determination that plaintiff might
have welcomed defendant's sexual advances); Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140, 1149 (7th
Cir. 1990) (finding no harassment where defendant's sexual advances toward plaintiff were
not unwelcome); Christensen v. Bozart, 879 F.2d 865, 1989 WL 79827, at *2 (9th Cir. 1989);
Lucas v. South Nassau Communities Hosp., 54 F. Supp. 2d 141, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Jensen
v. Kellings Fine Foods, Inc., 1987 WL 54411, at *11 (D. Kan. 1987); Kresko v. Rulli, 432
N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. App. 1989).
82. Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l, Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining by J.
Posner that "only a woman of Victorian delicacy" would find that the defendant's comments
rose to the level of sexual harassment); Lucas, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 148 (cursing and stating that
plaintiff wanted to go to bed with defendant are insufficient to state a claim - expletives and
comments which might be considered crude and vulgar when "falling on vestal ears" are
unfortunately commonplace in most current vocations); Lamanna-Berman v. Names &
Addresses, Inc., 1997 WL 803865, at *7 (finding that only a woman of "Victorian delicacy"
would find behavior in this case sexual harassment - comments about thong bikinis, rumors
about having an affair to get hired, and client asking for kisses).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
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Existing legal regulation of humiliation at work is worse than
arbitrary. In some respects, it is gender-, class-, and race-biased.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress invites judges to make
subjective judgments about what conduct is "extreme and outrageous,"
whether explicitly or unconsciously biased."s
The inadequacies of existing law and theory are apparent in a
pair of cases that are favorites of employment law casebook editors s
In one case, Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., a Texas company was trying
to force out an executive.' The company demoted him from one job
to another and finally to the position of "warehouse supervisor," whose
principal task was to clean up the employee cafeteria." Eventually,
the executive-turned-janitor sued for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.' The court held that the humiliation deliberately inflicted
on him was outrageous:
We find it difficult to conceive a workplace scenario more painful
and embarrassing than an executive, indeed a vice-president and
the assistant to the president, being subjected before his fellow
employees to the most menial janitorial services and duties of
cleaning up after entry level employees: the steep downhill push
to total humiliation was complete. 9
What does this case say about "menial jobs" in America? What
constitutes a humiliating demotion?" Without a greater understand-
ing of humiliation, it is difficult to rationally explain why working
as a janitor may have dignity for some, be humiliating but not
actionable for others, and constitute actionable humiliation for a few.
When I teach Monarch Paper, I compare it with another casebook
chestnut, Bodewig v. K-Mart, in which a male K-Mart manager
subjected a young female cashier to a strip search when an evidently
crazy female customer accused her of stealing twenty dollars. 9'
Emphasizing that the plaintiff was a shy and modest young woman,
84. Legal scholarship has long criticized the indeterminacy of the outrageousness
requirement of the emotional distress tort. See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum
Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. Rzv. 42 (1982); see also Austin, supra note 1, at 6-18
(critiquing the gendered and race-biased nature of the tort).
85. See, e.g., MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (4th ed. 1998).
86. 939 F.2d 1138, 1138 (5th Cir. 1991).
87. Id. at 1140.
88. Id. at 1141.
89. Id. at 1145.
90. See generally White, supra note 66 (describing the growing phenomenon in
employment discrimination cases that some discriminatory actions are too minor to be illegal).
91. Bodewig v. K-Mart, Inc., 635 P.2d 657 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
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the court held that the employer's conduct was outrageous.9 The
humiliations that courts deem outrageous enough to be actionable
seem heavily influenced by the court's notions of status, gender, and
class. Humiliation occurs in part because of the enormous psychologi-
cal salience of social status. Status is a complex amalgam with race,
gender, wealth, education, charm, charisma, and multiple other factors
as constituent parts. Why is strip-searching humiliating to a "shy,
modest, young woman" working as a K-Mart cashier, 3 but not to a
prison guard?9 Why is working as ajanitor humiliating to an execu-
tive, but not to a janitor?
If the case makes it to the jury, the jury will make similarly
arbitrary and biased judgments. The problem of fact-finder bias is
compounded and magnified as plaintiffs' lawyers assess which cases
are even worth pursuing: Is this plaintiff sufficiently young, naive,
vulnerable, and clean-cut to make a compelling witness? Will it come
out during the course of the litigation that the plaintiff has previously
engaged in behavior that the jury will find objectionable? When the
lawyer tries to establish that the plaintiffs acute emotional distress
is due to the workplace abuse, will cross-examination attempt to show
that it was a result of childhood sexual abuse, drug or alcohol abuse,
spousal abuse, a history of mental illness, or just the spite of a lazy
worker?
Legal scholarship alludes to the cultural biases inherent in
deciding which forms of workplace humiliation are acceptable and
which are legally outrageous, but it has not yet persuaded courts to
be more explicit or self-aware in their judgments or to organize the
vast and unruly mass of cases. A clearer understanding of the nature
and causes of humiliation might help everyone understand courts'
unexamined reactions to some employer practices and their concerns
about providing legal remedies, even for those practices they deplore.
III. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Humiliation is more pervasive and destructive than the law
currently acknowledges.95 Part of its destructiveness is in the perva-
sive powerlessness that the victim experiences.' Creating institutions
92. Id.
93. Id. at 662.
94. See McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1306 (8th Cir. 1987) (permitting strip
searching of prison employee if based on "reasonable suspicion based on specific objective facts
and rational inferences").
95. Austin, supra note 1, at 5, 30.
96. Hartling & Luchetta, supra note 13, at 261.
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where one can quickly and readily obtain justice could ameliorate
powerlessness. Psychological literature has asserted that a "strategy
for preventing the humiliation dynamic from running its course is
to alter either the reality of the power relationships among the triad
of participants, or the perception of the power relationships."' Law
plays this role in some circumstances, by allowing the intended victim
to confront or thwart the humiliator's plan by asserting a countervail-
ing power.9 From the perspective of a lawyer, however, the optimism
expressed in some of the psychological literature about the
humiliation-thwarting potential of laws identifying humiliation as
actionable' seems misplaced, at least in some cases. Law may
empower in some cases, but it may simply compound the humiliation
in others.
An additional difficulty with the law's treatment of workplace
humiliation is the challenge of proving damages. To prove that an
act was outrageous in tort, the plaintiff must show that she
experienced severe emotional distress."° Plaintiffs typically testify
to their symptoms: loss of sleep, anxiety, depression, and sometimes
worse. 1 Although proof of severe emotional distress or psychological
injury is not required to prove sexual harassment, other status-based
harassment,1 2 or invasion of privacy,' 3 such evidence is necessary
to recover damages for emotional distress even where liability for the
underlying claim does not require proof of distress.' This causation
requirement is deeply troubling.
The ability to recover will depend on the fortitude, the culture,
and the gender-role of the plaintiff. Men in some subcultures may
97. Swift, supra note 42, at 140.
98. Id. at 141.
99. Id. at 144 (noting that some women counteract humiliation by pursuing justice
through legal means).
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) (providing in pertinent part: "One
who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the
other results from it, for such bodily harm"). Courts tend to find that the outrageousness of
the conduct proves the requisite distress because courts have difficulty discerning whether
the plaintiffs asserted emotional distress is genuine. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 46 cmt. j (1965); William Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 44-45 (1965).
A discussion of cases in Givelber, supra note 84, at 47-48, demonstrates this point.
101. See, e.g., Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d at 1141 ("Wilson's emotional illness
was severe and long-lasting. Doctors diagnosed him with manic-depressive illness or bipolar
disorder. After his first hospitalization for a manic episode, in which he was locked in a
padded cell and heavily sedated, he fell into a deep depression."); see also Bodewig v. K-Mart,
635 P.2d at 662 (observing that plaintiff testified "she had two or three sleepless nights, cried
a lot and still gets nervous and upset when she thinks about the incident.").
102. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 65 2.A-E (1977).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965).
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have more trouble either displaying the required distress or later
testifying that they experienced it. Men who have been bullied
because of their perceived weakness' °5 or women working in male-
dominated occupations may display such emotions at their peril. Any
sign of emotion may be taken either as vulnerability and invitation
to further harassment, or as weakness that might cause their
superiors to lose confidence in their competence. Furthermore, there
is support in the psychological literature for the proposition that men
and women may experience harassment differently,' 6 and that victims
and perpetrators of interpersonal conflict perceive it very differently.' 7
Some cultures allow displays of affection that white American culture
considers evidence of emotional distress; others discourage such
displays.' Law should not declare humiliation to be more or less
wrongful depending on the gender or culture of the victim, yet when
proof of liability or damages rests on evidence of certain culturally
determined behaviors or affects, it does precisely that.
Moreover, when the law gives employees clues to the emotions
they should display, opportunistic people may display emotions for
instrumental reasons. Professor Sanger made precisely this point
at this symposium. In her view, the danger of such clues is that
emotions will lose the authenticity that makes them interesting in
the first place.'
A conservative critic of antidiscrimination law makes the same
point, but draws different conclusions."0 In his view, liability for
status-based humiliation simply will cause employees to feel more
distress than they would otherwise and will cause employers to censor
racist, sexist, and other speech and conduct that he evidently considers
either unobjectionable or a necessary part of life in a free society."'
In other words, liability for humiliation is simply a subsidy for
weakness: "As economists point out, if you subsidize something, you
get more of it. If the legal remedies of the antidiscrimination law,
particularly monetary remedies, subsidize feelings of outrage and
105. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
106. See Christopher W. Williams, Richard S. Brown & Paul R. Lees-Haley, An
Attributional (Causal Dimensional) Analysis of Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 25 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1169 (1995).
107. Roy F. Baumeister, Arlene Stillwell & Sara R. Wotman, Victim and Perpetrator
Accounts of Interpersonal Conflict: Autobiographical Narratives About Anger, 59 J. PERSON-
ALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 994 (1990).
108. See generally Austin, supra note 1, at 11 (noting that workers are not a "monolith").
109. See Carol Sanger, The Role and Reality of Emotions in Law, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 107 (2001).
110. David E. Bernstein, Sex Discrimination Laws Versus Civil Liberties, 1999 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 133, 171(1999).
111. Id.
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insult, we will get more feelings of outrage and insult, a net social
loss." "' In his view, therefore, the problem with antidiscrimination
law's effort to prohibit humiliating discrimination is that it weakens
the fortitude that is necessary to live in a free society: '"ot only is
certain thickness of skin necessary for a successful free society, but
a society that has a legal system that expects such thick skin is likely
to get it.""'
Will law prompt people to display emotions irrespective of whether
they feel them, as Professor Sanger suggests, or will it go farther and
prompt people to feel emotion they would not otherwise feel, as
Professor Bernstein suggests? Professor Bernstein is patently wrong
if he believes that people would experience less humiliation if law
did not regard discrimination as actionably humiliating. 14 Sexual
harassment was humiliating even when it was legal. It does not
follow, however, that law has no influence on how people think and
feel about their world. Is the illegality of discrimination empowering
to victims, by making them understand that their misfortune is not
attributable to their own failings and is not unique to them? Or, is
it disempowering by making them assume the role of the traumatized
victim as the price of obtaining redress? Emotionsjurisprudence may
help us understand whether law facilitates the feminist project of
making the personal political and the consciousness-raising effort
of"naming and blaming," or whether law has undermined the efforts
ofdisempowered workers to redistribute wealth, power, and prestige
in the workplace.
The law compounds the humiliation by having a remedial
structure that is arbitrary, expensive, and difficult. Millions of dollars
to one secretary who is sexually harassed can operate to humiliate
the winning plaintiff - accused of receiving a huge windfall she does
not deserve - other plaintiffs who recover little or nothing, and others
who are implicitly and explicitly condemned for never having had the
gumption, tenacity, time, energy, or money to assert a claim at all.
Now that a generation of feminist and critical race scholarship has
illuminated the many forms of workplace humiliation and the
gendered, racialized, and class-bound nature of much of it, we should
attend to the failure of the remedial structure of employment law to
uncover, prevent, and remedy such humiliation. In short, we should
study the role that law plays in perpetuating that humiliation and
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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how legal remedies might be re-imagined to effectively and affordably
stop workplace humiliation.
The particular form of legal intervention is as important as its
existence. Too much of existing employment law plays only a
deterrent and a vengeance role; there is too little law playing a
remedial role." By remedial, I mean that legal intervention should
be available in the context of an ongoing relationship, not merely once
the firing or driving out of the employee occurs. The great achieve-
ment of collective bargaining in a unionized workplace is the grievance
arbitration system that allows a worker an immediate, affordable,
remedy for "small" incidents of abuse or unfairness, as well as large
ones."16 Part of the function of the grievance system is to protect
workers from the humiliation of arbitrary supervisory action."'
Employees in a non-union workplace have no such institutional
antidote to "small" humiliations, and, indeed, the irregular patchwork
of legal protections described above shows that they often have no
legal remedy for large ones either."'
In advocating that law play a remedial role in workplace disputes,
I do not mean to suggest that ADR should supplant all employment
law and litigation. The spread of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
of all employment claims could lead to the end of employment law,
because the lower damages, absence of procedural protections, and
total privacy of arbitration undermine the role of litigation as the
process by which society articulates and enforces norms of acceptable
behavior. What I suggest instead is the creation of fair mechanisms
to adjudicate disputes during ongoing employment relationships as
a supplement to, not a substitute for, courts' traditional role in en-
forcing tort, contract, and statutory rights at the end of a relationship.
The unfairness of the current regime is harmful not only to those
whose humiliation goes without remedy. The impression that law
will aid only some people in the quest for a workplace free of
harassment and humiliation provides a cover of legitimacy, and
perhaps even fuel, for a backlash that may undermine all anti-
discrimination law. Law reviews lately have lavished significant
attention on the argument that enforcement of antidiscrimination
law to prevent humiliation is ,a significant deprivation of the civil
115. See Austin, supra note 1, at 30-31.
116. Id. (noting that only legal "upheaval on a larger scale is likely to produce structured
change").
117. Id. at 31 (stating that "causes of action are not the ideal structural response to
unrestrained supervisory discretion").
118. Id.
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rights of employers, men, whites, and others. 1 9 Some contend that
greater legal protection for women deprives men of equal protection.'
Some argue that civil rights laws infringe unacceptably on the right
of persons to associate with whom they choose, to speak as they wish,
and to impose their religious views in their workplace.121 The
widespread perception that only women and people of color have legal
protection against humiliation at work fuels the perception that the
Constitution should protect the rights of some groups to humiliate
others by calling it freedom of religion, speech, or equal treatment
for men or whites.
IV. CONCLUSION
This symposium asked us to contemplate the significance of the
emerging jurisprudence of emotions for the ongoing project of gender
jurisprudence. Thus, it is appropriate to conclude by suggesting that
without a generation of feminist jurisprudence, it would be neither
possible nor intelligible to advocate the development of an encompass-
ing legal theory of workplace humiliation.
One of the accomplishments and insights of feminist legal theory
has been to draw attention to the ways that gender, as well as race
and class, are systematically used to humiliate women, poor people,
and people of color. Beyond that, feminist theory has, by showing
that the personal truly is political, introduced the previously invisible
sphere of interpersonal emotional dynamics into legitimate academic
discourse. Thus, courts and scholars can now see how subordinated
groups disproportionately suffer workplace humiliation, and how the
experience of humiliation transcends gender, race, and class lines.
Today's gender jurisprudence demonstrates the importance of
gendered norms in the construction of power and powerlessness. 2
It does more than that, however. It helps us see the enormous
influence that social status has in determining which experiences are
humiliating and on the law's partial and inconsistent remedies for
workplace humiliation.' Humiliation occurs when the humiliator
119. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 110; Eugene Volokh, supra note 9 (citing literature
that exemplifies the amount of attention paid to this aspect of employment law).
120. Brian Lehman, The Equal Protection Problem in Sexual Harassment Doctrine, 10
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 125 (2000).
121. Bernstein, supra note 110; Tung Yin, How the Americans with Disabilities Act's
Prohibition on Pre-Employment.Offer Disability-Related Questions Violates the First
Amendment, 17 LAB. LAW. 107 (2001).
122. See discussion supra notes 91-93 (noting the court's emphasis on typical gender
demeanor in Bodewig).
123. See generally Austin, supra note 1, at 10, 25.
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denies the agency and autonomy of the object of humiliation. The
long-term project of feminism has been to claim autonomy and agency
for women; to transform them from objects controlled by men into
subjects with their own control. The development of ajurisprudence
of workplace respect for all persons is the unfinished business of the
project offeminist jurisprudence.
